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Section 3.0 of NASA's Human Rating Requirements for Space Systems, NPR 
8705.2, represents technical engineering requirements that the Agency 
requires of Human Space Systems. In many cases the requirements are not 
unlike requirements for any space system, crewed or uncrewed, they deal 
with successfully accomplishing the mission objectives. However, they go 
one step further and have requirements that go beyond successful 
completion of the mission and dictate functions or actions necessary to 
assure the survival of the crew. In that regard they are unique from other 
space system requirements.  Even with their uniqueness the technical 
requirements of the NPR 8705.2 have been relatively unchanged in overall 
intent over the revisions. They all have provided for system redundancy, 
crew habitable environment, crew situational awareness, crew operation, 
system control, emergency egress and abort systems. In a few cases the 
intent of the requirement was changed intentionally, either to restrict 
certain types of systems or their functions, or to encompass lessons learned 
from previous programs. For the most part the requirements are non 
controversial and represent the current best practices for human space 
systems, however, a few requirements are always debated and have 
evolved over revisions of the NPR due to studies conducted with various 
programs like the Orbital Space Plane and the Constellation Programs. 
Those requirements will be discussed using results of trade studies 
conducted during past programs highlighting how these particular 
requirements have evolved through the revisions of the NPR. Comments 
will also be provided for requirements that although not debated, have 
provided challenges in interpretation. 
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NASA’s Human Rating Requirements - 
A Historical Interpretive Perspective 
What is a “Human Rated” System? 
“The concept of a man-rated space system entails the incorporation of 
those design features and requirements necessary to 
accommodate human participants within the system and thus 
provide the capability to safely conduct manned operations, 
including safe recovery from any credible emergency situation.  
Man-rating is the process of evaluating and assuring that the total 
system, both hardware and software, has the ability to meet 
prescribed, safety oriented design and operational criteria and 
requirements, and becomes involved in all program activities 
including design and development, test and verification, 
management and control and finally, certification for operational 
readiness” 
 “A Review of Man-Rating in Past and Current Manned Space Flight 
Programs”, A. Bond, 1988 
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Tenants of Human Rating per NPR 8705.2B 
The fundamental intent has not changed over the decades… 
Human rating is the process of designing, evaluating and assuring 
that the total system can safely conduct the mission.  
–  Managing risk in a highly constrained situation 
–  Exploring risk and uncertainty 
–  Hazard identification and control.  
A system design that accommodates and utilizes human 
capabilities and system interactions 
–  Providing for basic human needs 
–  Providing insight and control 
A system that provides the capability to safely recover the crew  
–  Acknowledgement of inherent risk and unpredictability of hazards in 
human spaceflight 
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Evolution of Implementation 
As the Agency has attempted to codify these Human Rating best 
practices, they have struggled with the limitations of the English 
language, consensus requirements development and artificial 
constraints of “Rules for Rules” of requirements writing, the latest 
revisions acknowledges this limitation explicitly… 
“It is impossible to develop a set of Agency-level technical requirements that 
will definitively result in the development of safe systems for all human 
space missions…” 
“These technical requirements should not be interpreted as all inclusive or 
absolute” 
“The Project Manager is expected to evaluate the intent of these technical 
requirements and use the talents of the development and operation team to 
design the safest practical system that will accomplish the mission within 
the constraints”  [mass, volume, cost and schedule]  
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Evolution of Requirements/Guidelines 
Bond (1988) 
Philosophical Tenets 
(10) 
Criteria/Requirements 
(16) Ceremele (1991) 
Philosophy (12) 
Guidelines (19) 
•   Criteria 
•   Practices 
•   Reliability 
•   Test and 
Verification 
•   Management 
Review 
•   Ops and 
Maintenance JSC-28354 (1998)  
16 Requirements 
•   General (5) 
•   Safety and Reliability (7) 
•   Human in the Loop (4) 
More Human-in-the-
Loop Oriented 
Less on the ‘soft-side’ 
of human system 
project management 
- Building in quality 
- Individual 
accountability  
-  No unexplained 
anomalies 
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Evolution of Requirements/Guidelines 
NPR 8705.2 Rev 0 
(2003) 
Technical 
Requirements (~59) 
NPR 8705.2 Rev A 
(2005) 
Technical Requirements 
(~51) 
• Reorganization 
based on lessons 
learned from SLI/
OSP program 
application of rev 0 
•  “Rules for Rules” 
NPR 8705.2 Rev B 
(2008) 
Technical Requirements (~32) 
•  Incorporation of early 
CEV/Orion lessons on 
failure tolerance 
•  Simplification of human 
insight and control 
requirements 
Less Prescriptive 
More emphasis on 
application dependency 
More demanding with 
respect to Systems 
Engineering context and 
analysis 
More emphasis on the process of achieving human rating; 
roles and responsibilities; expectations for lifecycle of 
program 
The Pareto Principle or the 80/20 Rule 
20 percent of the requirements will result in 80 percent 
of the debate with regard to implementation 
•  There is always a fundamental debate about reliability driven 
design vs. prescriptive design features 
–  It remains NASA’s position, for NASA Human Systems, that some level 
of prescription remains appropriate due to the inability to validate 
reliability driven analysis 
•  Historically, and with Space Launch Initiative/Orbital Space 
Plane (SLI/OSP) and Constellation as most recent test cases, 
there are a small number requirements which always generate 
the most consternation 
–  Fault Tolerance Requirements (Hardware, Human Error and Software) 
–  Crew Escape/Abort and Emergency Systems 
–  Manual Control/Human-in-the-loop Requirements 
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Fault Tolerance (hardware, human error and software) 
Requirement JSC 28354 (1998) Baseline NPR 
(2003) 
REV A (2005) REV B (2008) 
Failure Tolerance All critical systems 
essential for crew safety 
shall be designed to be 
two-fault tolerant. When 
this is not practical, 
systems shall be designed 
so that no single failure 
shall cause loss of the 
crew.  
All human-rated space 
flight systems shall be 
designed so that no two 
failures shall result in 
permanent disability or 
loss of life.   
Space systems shall be 
designed so that no two 
failures result in crew or 
passenger fatality or 
permanent disability 
The space system shall 
provide failure tolerance to 
catastrophic events 
(minimum of one failure 
tolerant), with the specific 
level of failure tolerance 
(one, two or more) and 
implementation (similar or 
dissimilar redundancy) 
derived from an integrated 
design and safety 
analysis . 
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Requirement JSC 28354 (1998) Baseline NPR 
(2003) 
REV A (2005) REV B (2008) 
Emergency 
Systems 
-  Emergency systems (such 
as fire suppression and 
crew escape) shall not be 
considered to satisfy 
failure tolerance 
requirements; however, 
these systems may be 
utilized in evaluation of 
failure mitigation and in 
reducing probability of loss 
of life 
The space system shall 
provide the failure 
tolerance capability in 
3.2.2 without the use of 
emergency equipment and 
systems (Requirement). 
The space system shall 
provide the failure 
tolerance capability in 
3.2.2 without the use of 
emergency equipment and 
systems 
Fault Tolerance 
•  Requirement most debated.  Debates range from: 
–  ‘Should be a reliability requirement’ 
–  ‘Fully two failure tolerant’  (Shuttle/International Space Station) 
•  Orbital Space Plane Program began to change paradigm.  
–  Use of commercial Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) fleet (Delta IV/
Atlas V) 
–  Precedent from Mercury/Gemini Program.  
•  Some added redundancy 
•  Manned Space Flight Awareness Program 
–  Saturn V/Shuttle developed exclusively for human flights 
•  Rev A tried to address Lessons Learned from SLI/OSP.  
–  Applied exceptions to two failure tolerance. 
•  Failure tolerance not practical 
•  Added FT no longer reduces risk 
•  Design For Minimum Risk (DFMR) 
–  Resultant Process was to start at two failure tolerance and provide 
rationale for exclusions to the requirement.  9 
Failure Tolerance (FT) 
•  Cx Identified Issues with Rev A 
–  Very strict 2 Fault Tolerance interpretation 
–  Reliability.  Historic data showed that in some 
cases adding failure tolerance beyond a certain 
level did little to improve reliability for launchers. 
0 to 1 shows marked improvement, 1 to 2 very 
little.  
–  Rev A did not exclude use of abort for failure 
tolerance.   
•  Changes Were Made for Rev B 
–  Allowed a minimum of single FT.  Requires 
levels of FT to be justified in a provided 
Integrated Safety Analysis. 
–  Reliability becomes a commodity like mass or 
power 
–  Explicitly excluded ascent abort as a method of 
meeting the failure tolerance.  Allowed for 
mission termination (early end of mission) on 
orbit as a method of meeting failure tolerance.  
Rev A implementation: 
•  Ares had avionics architectures that were either 3 or 
4 strings depending on whether Abort was counted 
as part of FT. 
•  Orion weight challenges exacerbated by stove-
piped 3 and 4 string systems. 
Rev B implementation: 
•  Ares avionics architecture fixed at three strings. 
•  Orion started a weight scrubbing exercise that 
started at single FT and had systems buy into more 
redundancy as required to meet mission objectives 
and reliability goals resulting in two FT in key, high 
risk systems, including avionics.  In critical systems 
where single FT was allowed, cross strapping of 
strings was employed to retain degraded operation 
after the second failure. 
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Conclusion:  Although failure tolerance is an important requirement it should 
not be looked at solely alone but in combination with reliability predictions 
and overall mission objectives.  
Human Error 
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Requirement JSC 28354 (1998) Baseline NPR 
(2003) 
REV A (2005) REV B (2008) 
Human Error -  All human-rated space 
flight systems shall be 
designed so that neither 
two human errors during 
operation or in-flight 
maintenance nor a 
combination of one human 
error and one failure shall 
result in permanent 
disability or loss of life. 
The system shall be 
designed and operated so 
that neither two 
inadvertent actions during 
operation or in-flight 
maintenance nor a 
combination of one 
inadvertent action and one 
failure result in crew or 
passenger fatality or 
permanent disability. 
The space system shall be 
designed to tolerate 
inadvertent operator action 
(minimum of one 
inadvertent action), as 
identified by the human 
error analysis (paragraph 
2.3.11), without causing a 
catastrophic event 
Human Error  
•  Baseline version of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) dictated two 
error tolerance for all types of human error, both omission and commission.  
•  During the Rev A rewrite the Crew Office noted that some of that 
implementation in the ISS program was ‘over-bearing’ and did little to 
enhance safety.  
•  Argued that inadvertent actions was more the culprit.  Protecting against 
other errors lead to a more complicated system prone to other errors.  
•  Rev A was then changed to reflect a two inadvertent error requirement. 
•  Subsequently Rev B was changed to be similar to the fault tolerance 
requirement requiring a minimum of one error tolerance (inadvertent action). 
•  Levels of error tolerance must be justified as part of integrated safety 
analysis.  
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Conclusion:  Just as in failure tolerance, levels of human error protection 
should be governed by analysis of potential errors and criticality of those 
errors.  
Fault Tolerance (hardware, human error and software) 
Requirement JSC 28354 (1998) Baseline NPR 
(2003) 
REV A (2005) REV B (2008) 
Software Failure  -  The control of vehicle flight 
path and attitude, during 
dynamic phases of flight 
such as ascent and entry, 
shall be provided by 
independently developed 
and redundant software 
systems. 
The system design shall 
prevent or mitigate the 
effects of common cause 
failures in time-critical 
software (e.g., flight 
control software during 
dynamic phases of flight 
such as ascent. 
i.  Redundant 
independent 
software running on 
a redundant 
identical flight 
computer 
ii.  Use of an alternate 
guidance platform, 
computer and 
software 
iii.   Use of nearly 
identical source 
code uniquely 
compiled for 
different dissimilar 
processors. 
The space system shall 
provide the capability to 
mitigate the hazardous 
behavior of critical 
software where the 
hazardous behavior would 
result in a catastrophic 
event.  
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Software Failure Mitigation 
•  First instantiation of independently developed and coded Backup 
Flight Control System (BFCS or BFS) shows up in the baseline version 
of the NPR (Rev 0). 
•  Historic first implementation is in the Space Shuttle Program  
–  Concerns with software error forcing all four computers to fail resulted in addition 
of a 5th computer with independently developed source code specifically for the 
dynamic phases of flight (ascent and reentry).  
–  Crew could select between them.  
•  EELVs for OSP did not have BFS. 
–  Program argued for alternate methods of achieving the same levels of reliability 
•  Boeing 777 approach of “same” code on different compilers on dissimilar processors. 
•  Use of spacecraft guidance and control for a backup of launch vehicle  
•  Rev A of the NPR allowed for alternate methods. 
•  Constellation Program conducted agency wide trade study on BFS for 
ascent and came to the conclusion it was not required. 
–  Ares Project concluded BFS was not necessary for their brief duration mission 
–  Orion Project concluded BFS was appropriate for crewed spacecraft 
•  Rev B of NPR modified to current version eliminating redundancy as 
an absolute requirement for flight SW.  14 
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Software Fault Tolerance Options 
And Associated Trade Tree Analysis (Ares-like) 
15 National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
In Baseline 
Not In Baseline, 
Non BFS, Some 
N/A (Not Viable) 
Trade Space 
For BFS 
SCCF 
SCCF Other/Multiple (Branch) 
Architecture 
Error Detection 
Exception 
Handling 
Static & 
Dynamic 
Checkpoint 
Recovery 
Process 
Pairing 
Data 
Manipulation 
Recovery Block 
N Version 
N Self 
Checking 
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Recovery Block 
t/(n-1) Variant 
Horizontal Partition 
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Unit Closure 
Atomic Action 
Timing 
Reasonableness 
Encoding 
Data Structure 
Data Integrity 
Inversion 
Deterministic 
Modular 
Random 
Input Adjust/     
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Output Adjust 
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Acceptance 
Testing 
Comparison 
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Design 
Coding 
Reviews 
Analyses 
Testing 
Single Version 
Multi-Version 
Input Data 
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Restart 
Abort 
Tolerate 
Work Around 
Prevent 
Remove 
SW Failure 
•  Results of Trade Study (Ares) 
–  BFS not required in response to primary flight software common cause 
failure.  
–  Risk based on time of flight, code complexity (and size), and coding 
techniques employed deemed low enough to not justify the added 
expenditure. (20-40% of primary load).  
–  Baseline coding techniques shown in trade tree deemed sufficient to 
meet the intent of NPR 8705.2b.  
–  Trade study left the SW architecture in baseline form.  
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Software Fault Tolerance Options 
And Associated Trade Tree Analysis (Orion-like) 
17 National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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SW Failure 
•  Results of Trade Study (Orion) 
–  BFCS capability required in response to primary flight software common 
cause failure by using dissimilar hardware and software 
–  BFCS coverage targeted to survive the crisis – not to duplicate all 
primary software capabilities.  Assumes primary software can be 
recovered. 
–  Covers dynamic flight phases where recovery of primary flight control 
functions are not immediately achievable 
•  Ascent (launch thru orbit insertion & solar array deploy) 
•  De-orbit/Entry (through landing) 
•  On orbit flight phases considered ‘dynamic’ (eg  TEI 3 burn, RPOD backout) 
–  Manual survival mode capabilities are provided to breathe, 
communicate, and control critical power loads without computer control 
(or network).  Likewise, manual emergency entry capabilities are 
planned for manual roll control and pyro event initiation  
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Crew Escape, Abort and Emergency Systems 
Requirement JSC 28354 
(1998) 
Baseline NPR 
(2003) 
REV A (2005) REV B (2008) 
Abort The program shall be 
designed such that 
the cumulative 
probability of safe 
crew return over the 
life of the program 
exceeds 0.99. This 
shall be 
accomplished 
through the use of all 
available 
mechanisms 
including mission 
success, abort, safe 
haven, and crew 
escape. 
A crew escape 
system shall be 
provided on ETO 
vehicles for safe crew 
extraction and 
recovery from in-flight 
failures across the 
flight envelope from 
prelaunch to landing. 
The escape system 
shall have a 
probability of 
successful crew 
return of 0.99 
The capability for crew 
and occupant survival 
and recovery shall be 
provided on ascent 
using a combination of 
abort and escape. 
The capability for crew 
and occupant survival 
and recovery shall be 
provided during all 
other phases of flight 
(including on-orbit, 
reentry, and landing) 
using a combination of 
abort and escape, 
unless comprehensive 
safety and reliability 
analyses indicate that 
abort and escape 
capability is not 
required to meet crew 
survival requirements. 
The space system shall provide crew and 
passenger survival modes throughout the 
ascent and on-orbit profile (from hatch closure 
until atmosphere entry interface) in the 
following order of precedence: 
a.  Abort. 
b.  Escape by retaining the crew and 
passengers encapsulated in a portion of the 
vehicle that can reenter without crew or 
passenger fatality or permanent disability. 
c.  Escape by removing the crew and 
passengers from the vehicle. 
The program shall ensure that ascent survival 
modes can be successfully accomplished 
during any ascent failure mode including, but 
not limited to, complete loss of thrust, complete 
loss of control, and catastrophic booster failure 
at any point during ascent. 
The space system shall provide crew and 
passenger survival modes throughout the 
descent profile (from entry interface through 
landing) in the following order of precedence : 
a.  Design features that increase tolerance to 
loss of critical functions such that landing can 
still be accomplished. 
b.  Escape. 
The program shall ensure that the descent 
survival modes can be successfully 
accomplished for loss of critical functions 
including, but not limited to, loss of active 
attitude control and loss of primary power 
The space system 
shall provide abort 
capability from the 
launch pad until 
Earth-orbit insertion 
to protect for the 
following ascent 
failure scenarios 
(minimum list): 
a. Complete loss of 
ascent thrust/
propulsion 
(Requirement). 
b. Loss of attitude or 
flight path control 
(Requirement) 
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Abort 
•  The pre-baseline version of NPR 8705.2 called for a probability of safe 
crew return using escape, abort, and safe haven capabilities. 
–  Difficult to quantify ascent abort environments.  
–  Studies conducted during the OSP program indicated that 99% was probably not 
achievable.   
•  Baseline version removed quantified part of the requirement.  
–  Still no preference on use of either abort or escape.  
–  Total coverage unspecified.  
•  Rev A dealt with establishing an order of precedence for crew survival 
options.  
–  Carefully defined abort as the return of the crew in the spacecraft normally used 
for reentry – acknowledging value of keeping crew in vehicle 
–  Allowed for an escape mechanism in a partial portion of the spacecraft, or as a 
last resort, classical crew escape (ejection).  
–  Specified total coverage on ascent abort as 100% (no black zones).  
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Abort 
•  Rev A also led to the requirement that abort be accomplished without 
use of main propulsion and during loss of control scenarios. 
–  This requirement was driven by perceived shortfalls in previous implementation 
•   The Space Shuttle had near 100% abort coverage, but required a minimum number of  
main engines to still be operation at various times during the trajectory. 
•  Requires a solution that allows for the crew to be removed from the launch vehicle. 
–  NPR users mistakenly believed that this was the ENTIRE requirement for 
monitoring for failures that could trigger an abort.   
–  Other failures are just as likely, and need to be monitored, but Rev A Specifies that 
you must be able to accomplish an abort without the functions of propulsion and 
attitude control which are the end result of many failures.  
•  Rev B removed all references to escape and prescriptive failures on 
entry 
–  All architectures studied and then implemented during Constellation used a capsule 
based solution that was separable from the launch vehicle – Escape wasn’t 
meaningful  
–  Entry success and failure tolerance down modes embedded in other requirements  
•  Critical HW and SW failure, degraded modes, and redundancy requirement 
•  Mission abort (declaring the mission over and returning with adequate redundancy for 
reentry).  
•  Robust entry is still required. 21 
Primary Entry Down Modes provide a graceful degradation of Entry 
performance as system failures occur 
Orion Implementation of Entry Abort Modes 
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Manual Control and Human-in-the-Loop 
Requirement JSC 28354 (1998) Baseline NPR 
(2003) 
REV A (2005) REV B (2008) 
Manual Control   The flight crew shall be 
capable of taking manual 
control of the vehicle 
during all phases of flight. 
The vehicle shall exhibit 
Level I handling qualities 
as defined by the Cooper-
Harper Rating Scale 
On ascent, manual control 
of the vehicle flight path 
and attitude shall be 
provided where vehicle 
structural, thermal, and 
performance margins 
allow. 
During all phases of flight, 
the system shall provide 
the capability for manual 
control of flight path and 
attitude, when the human 
can operate the system 
within the structural, 
thermal, and performance 
margins without causing 
crew or passenger fatality 
or permanent disability 
The crewed space system 
shall provide the capability 
for the crew to manually 
control the flight path and 
attitude of their spacecraft, 
with the following 
exception: during the 
atmospheric portion of 
Earth ascent when 
structural and thermal 
margins have been 
determined to negate the 
benefits of manual control 
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Manual Control 
•  Another hotly debated requirement for the ascent portion of the 
flight.  
•  All US launch vehicles developed for manned flight (Saturn I/V 
and the Space Shuttle allowed for the crew to manually steer 
the vehicle.  
–  Has never been used during flight.   
–  Shuttle inhibited by flight rule from manual control during the first 90 
seconds.  
–  Limited utility especially during regions around max Q.   
–  Requirement allows for limits based on vehicle structural and thermal 
margins.  
•  NPR has remained relatively unchanged in this regard.   
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Take Away – The Art of Human Rating 
•  Human rating is really just about system functionality required for the 
accommodation, utilization and protection of the human in the 
system in order to maximize mission success 
•  Requirement intent is directly traceable to and has remained intact 
from the beginning of human space flight programs 
•  These requirements define an intent which is not a single 
implementation for all designs or all missions 
•  The requirements can not be implemented without the 
acknowledgement of real programmatic constraints to success 
•  Pay more attention to the necessity of demonstrating the details of 
the design and how systems interact, particularly in failure 
scenarios, versus the exact verbiage of the requirement 
•  Do not underestimate the contribution of personal responsibility and 
accountability as an important enabler to establishing the best, most 
robust design within programs constraints 
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